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First they ignore you.
Then they laugh at you.
Then they fight you.
Then you win.
~Mahatma Gandhi
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Introduction
With the smoke of a genocidal civil war scarcely cleared, over
half a million people descended upon Belgrade with bread and
bricks—bricks not for throwing but for rebuilding, as they de-
manded that Milosevic’s fraudulent election be recalled. Al-
though some demonstrators were met with violence, they did not
return it. Still, a dictator fell.
A mass of young protestors gathered from all reaches of
Georgia, storming the government and parliament buildings,
armed with food and roses for the very soldiers who were meant
to stop them, by force if need be. Not a shot was fired, yet the
sitting president was forced to resign.
Sheltered by navy blue umbrellas with similar white t-shirts
and carrying signs that read “No to One-Party Rule,” a quarter
of a million to half a million people have repeatedly gathered in
Hong Kong demanding an end to China’s one-party rule, despite
threats of violence from Beijing.
Indonesian students, teachers, nurses, and even security offic-
ers amassed throughout their nation. Some were threatened,
some “disappeared.” Yet, when almost a thousand protestors
were killed in a government operation to halt the organizing,
roughly one million demonstrators flooded the streets of the
capital and other towns and cities. In the end, a dictator who had
been in place for over three decades lost power.
i
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What new global and state conditions are enabling this surge
of “people power?” What characteristics define these peaceful
revolutions? How might peace workers, scholars, civil society,
and even governments themselves encourage them? Are they
proving sustainable? Should they be encouraged? How should
government and international organizations respond? This
fascinating and potentially revolutionary trend raises a number
of questions which peace workers and policy makers must an-
swer.
ii
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Forward
While one must always be cautious about overly optimistic
predictions of an emerging global civil society or sweeping new
democratic reform, such examples of “people power” constitute
an emerging trend of genuine deep democracy across the globe,
which governments and international organizations will increas-
ingly have to contend with in their policymaking. New leaders
have emerged who called upon the ideals and techniques of
Martin Luther King Jr. and Gandhi.
Consider, for example, the demonstrations across the world
against the recent war in Iraq. Those protests represented millions
of people in the US, the UK, Japan, South Korea, Italy, Spain,
Latin America, the Middle East, and throughout Africa (nearly
half a million gathered in London alone!). Thus, it represented the
largest and most powerful gathering of civil society globally that
the world has ever witnessed. It’s quite true that these demonstra-
tions did not have their intended effect, but the size and scale of
the mobilization, and its global nature, which crossed boundaries
of class, gender, nationality, and faith was unprecedented.
On November 1, 2003, 100,000 Israeli demonstrators con-
verged in Tel Aviv to protest Sharon’s policies towards Palestine.
They believe that these policies are in the interest of neither
Palestine, nor Israel. What is interesting about this, however, is
that while this demonstration did make the news in many global
outlets, it was not mentioned at all by the mainstream American
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press. Similarly (though there was some coverage), some Europe-
ans report that they were not aware of the large demonstrations
against the Iraq War in New York, Washington, San Francisco
and other US cities. All told, mass demonstrations in cities across
the globe totaled as many as ten million protestors, constituting
the largest unified expression of civil society the world has yet
seen (SunStar Online). As we will see in our case studies, the role
of the media in peace and conflict is critical.
Of course, as most political scientists have noted, for the last
several centuries, democracy seems to have increased gradually
across the globe, from the revolutions of the 18th Century, to the
collapse of the Soviet Empire at the end of the 20th Century. Yet,
the rising tide of deep democracy is something altogether new
and different. Citizens are increasingly making use of peaceful
means to bring about social change. The movement to shape
global economy around the needs of people, rather than the other
way around, continues throughout Africa and Latin America
especially, but also in North America and Europe as well. This
can be seen in the movement for debt cancellation for impover-
ished nations, fair trade, and reform of the Bretton Woods institu-
tions.
This people power movement for economic justice found its
most powerful expression in Seattle, at the 1999 World Trade
Organization meetings.  Tens of thousands of people from vari-
ous nations and backgrounds nearly brought the city of Seattle
to a standstill, and did succeed in shutting down or delaying
iv
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some of the meetings of the WTO.  Indeed, a state of emergency
was declared and a city-wide curfew imposed (“Seattle” Online).
The protestors carried signs, chanted, blocked traffic, and
marched through the streets where the meetings which would
determine the shape and scope of global trade were held. They
represented a stunning variety of sectors—labor, faith and soli-
darity groups, environmentalists, Southern civil society groups
from around the globe, as well as a small group of anarchists in
gas masks, all cooperated to demand that the needs of the poor
be made a central priority of the international financial institu-
tions.
While the handful of anarchists did vandalize property, the
rest of the protestors were peaceful, even taking it upon them-
selves to stop the anarchists.  The demonstrators used music,
street theatre, banners, sit ins and other forms of civil disobedi-
ence to make their demands heard.  Prompting Amnesty Inter-
national to call for an investigation, some protestors were
tear-gassed, pepper sprayed, and fired upon with rubber bullets;
some had their noses broken!  Symbolic of the global nature of
this movement, as protestors in Seattle marched, protestors
throughout France, London and Switzerland marched in solidar-
ity with those in Seattle (“Trade Talks” Online).
The legacy of what is now often called “The Battle of Seattle”
remains alive.  Since 1999, each meeting of the IMF, the World
Bank and the WTO has been met with demonstrations and civil
protests.  The demands of the people committed to this move-
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ment remain the same:  fair trade for the poorest, labor rights,
environmental standards and freedom from debt slavery.  The
impetus behind this mobilization of global civil society is the
same as the nonviolent revolutions profiled below:  an insistence
that the rights and basic needs of the people be respected, and
that civil participation in decision making is a must for just
policies.
Civil society influenced the World Bank in other ways as well.
One little known example of this resulted from the work of the
Campaign for Tibet, a non-governmental organization who
advocates for that nation.  The World Bank had (against its own
regulations and procedures) approved funding for a program in
China which would have relocated 20,000 Chinese farmers to
Tibet!  The Campaign for Tibet discovered this, and responded
with a week of demonstrations outside the World Bank.  Report-
edly someone even hung a banner denigrating the Bank’s presi-
dent, James Wolfenson.  When he discovered this and the
illegality of the funding for this program, the funding was termi-
nated and the program cancelled.  This was an especially signifi-
cant victory for the economic justice movement, since it
represents the first time a civil group, an expression of people
power, succeeded in persuading the World Bank to change its
policies.
The most recent Indian elections, in May 2004, reveal similar
dynamics. Three hundred million people voted, but it was largely
the rural poor who influenced the vote, which resulted in the
vi
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ouster of the incumbent party whose policies had generated
wealth for India’s middle and upper classes, but not for the lower
classes. In many cases, revolutions such as this have borne the
fruit of real, sustainable change.  This change  is proving conta-
gious, as new technologies and international forums  provide
mechanisms for civil society to organize and express concerns.
Peace scholar Hannah Arendt once wrote of the importance of
distinguishing between force and strength. She noted that  de-
spite what she considered to be the regrettable intellectual impre-
cision of so many political scientists and sociologists who equate
force and power, historically, even monarchies have had to create
consent for their policies in order to be seen as legitimate. She
posited that power and force are actually opposites. One can
always tell when a regime is losing true power by its increasing
displays of force, she argued. Force, then, is actually a tell-tale
sign of weakness because, as Arendt noted, force is not necessary
when one exercises true power. Arendt defined this true power as
the ability to persuade and create consensus. As she summarized,
“politically speaking, it is insufficient to say that power and
violence are not the same. Power and violence are opposites;
where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent” (Arendt 71).
One can see this dynamic consistently displayed in the follow-
ing case studies of “people power” nonviolent revolutions (“Track
6” of Multi-Track Diplomacy) as they unfolded in Nepal, Indone-
sia, Belgrade, Hong Kong, and Georgia. The following case
studies will illustrate these characteristics and hopefully shed
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some light on what is causing these movements, as well as what
seems to have allowed them to succeed, whether or not this
success might be sustainable, and what policies might now be
necessary with this new global political reality.
viii
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Nepal: 1990 A Certificate of the People’s Sovereignty
We are not going to let up our fight for democracy.
There will be more and more people joining the
movement in coming days.
~Krishna Machhethu, Nepalese Political Analyst
TIMELINE
1955 King Tribhuwan dies; King Mahendra takes throne
1959 Mahendra adopts multi-party constitution
1960 Nepali Congress Party (NCP) wins elections;
B. P. Koirala elected premier
Mahendra suspends the constitution and parliament
1962 New constitution begins non-party system over
which King Mahendra has complete power
1972 Mahendra dies, Birenda becomes king
1980 Push for reform, King allows only non-party elections
1985 Nepali Congress Party begins civil disobedience
campaign, and boycotts non-party elections
Feb-Mar 1990 Massive pro-democracy demonstrations result in
death of hundreds of civilian protestors
8 Apr 1990 King Birendra agrees to a constitutional monarchy
1996 Maoist “People’s War” declared
1 Jun 2001 Royal family murdered; Gyanendra assumes throne
Oct 2002 King disbands Parliament in response to Maoists
Jan 2003 Maoists offer ceasefire
Aug 2003 Maoists terminate ceasefire
4 Oct 2003 King assumes executive powers, fires Prime Minister
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In the capital and throughout all of Nepal, beginning in
March 1990, for fifty days and nights, a massive demonstration
demanded that King Birendra allow the absolute monarchy,
which had been in place for 3,000 years, to progress to a constitu-
tional monarchy. The pro-democracy advocates peacefully forced
the king to reduce his power to essentially that of a ceremonial
monarch. Despite numerous deaths which attracted the notice of
the international media, despite demonstrations and even general
strikes, which brought Katmandu to a standstill, the government
was typically reluctant to devolve power. In fact, it claimed that
there was no need for such protests as Nepal already was a
democracy! (“Himalayan” Online). Yet countless reports of
relentless demands for change continued day after day and the
death toll mounted as soldiers fired on the protestors who were
usually students, university faculty, striking doctors, and other
professionals.
As the Economist reports, “the trigger happy security forces
killed at least fifty people who were marching peacefully to the
royal palace” (“God-King” Online). Similarly, the Japanese
Economic Newswire was filled with reports of demonstrations
and shootings; Time magazine likewise reported nearly a hun-
dred demonstrators killed at one rally, dozens at another (“Taste”
Online)(“Battle” Online).
In the end, however, the new constitution cited the Nepalese
people as “the source of authority” and reduced the King to a
constitutional monarch. Considering that many Nepalese revered
him as the incarnation of a god, and that the monarchy had been
2
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in place in Nepal for three thousand years, the deep cultural
change brought on by grassroots activism is astonishing. Indeed,
as one analyst wrote, the “relentless and uninterrupted struggle
by the banned Nepali Congress and various Communist factions
to restore democracy” was one of the major forces responsible for
bringing about “the downfall of the panchayat system” and the
birth of Nepal’s constitutional monarchy (Khadka).
The constitution, deemed by the government a “certificate of
the peoples’ sovereignty,” specifically made political parties legal
once again, providing for the necessary opposition and checks on
state power which are so essential to a functioning democracy.
The new constitution also guaranteed “fundamental rights,
protection of liberty, and the due process of law” (Khadka ). It
did, however, allow the monarchy to suspend those powers in the
event of an “emergency,” though legislative consultation or
consent was needed to do so. Evidence of the fierce legal struggle
between the democrats and the monarchists, the new constitution
forbids the King from vetoing legislation. Yet, it also requires the
monarchy’s consent for legislation to become law (Khadka). As
expected in a new democracy, various news media outlets devel-
oped. A bicameral legislature was created, and elections orga-
nized.
Once again, the role of the military was, though perhaps in
the background, essential to the success of the revolution. Some
reports, for example, suggest that there were hints of the military
being willing to “step in” for the king, were he unable put down
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the demonstrations (“God-King” Online). Perhaps mindful of
this, the king of course did relinquish quite a bit of monarchical
power hoping to quell the demonstrations. Not surprisingly, the
new role and place of the military was the subject of intense
debate and scrutiny as the constitution was written and rewritten.
Many political scientists have long noted the crucial importance
of civilian control of the military. Other failed revolutions (for
example, in Latin America) have demonstrated the essential
nature of this principal for a successful democracy. Naturally, as
the Economist reported at the time, “the King’s supporters op-
pose taking command of the army away from him and putting it
under civilian control” (“King’s Hand” Online). In the end, the
constitution placed control of the armed forces under the elected
government’s National Defense Council. Indeed, one of the
problems Nepal has faced in institutionalizing and sustaining its
democratic popular revolution is that “the Nepali Congress
government has not been able to buy the loyalty and commit-
ment of the military and police force….[which] is still very loyal
to the palace” (Khadka). This potentially threatens the civilian
control of the armed forces.
Traditional symbolism  found its way into the demonstrations
and celebrations which erupted after the King agreed to a parlia-
mentary democracy, with political parties legal again after
decades of autocratic rule. The Washington Post reported, “Busi-
nessmen, beggars, rickshaw drivers, students, children, and
tourists dabbed their faces with red paint—a Hindu rite of cel-
ebration—and poured through the streets in spontaneous demon-
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strations.” Many of them waved the flags of various political
parties in celebration of their newly-won freedom; this was for-
merly an offense that could have resulted in a prison sentence.
The demonstrators were successful, yet this success for Nepal
has proven difficult to sustain, and the end result continues to
unfold. The World Organization Against Torture reports:
Our sources indicate that on April 8th, 2004, an order banning
public demonstrations and the assembly of more than five persons
within the Kathmandu Ring Road and Lalitpur areas was issued by
the Kathmandu District Administration. Following this, demonstra-
tors have been violently repressed, with demonstrators having been
beaten and potentially several thousand persons have been arbitrarily
arrested without warrants by the armed police. (World Online)
Furthermore, “the government so far has failed to make a
dent on Nepal’s economic problems” (Khadka). Legal battles
have also been fought over the right to use indigenous languages.
Most clearly, of course, the Maoist insurgency, which is trying to
remove the elected government, represents a threat to the democ-
racy Nepal has built. Yet many of the necessary legal protections
and institutions for a free society are in place, suggesting the
possibility for the long-term success of Nepal’s nonviolent, demo-
cratic revolution.
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Indonesia—“Reformasi!”1998
We will continue the struggle,
Whatever the Government does,
Even if that means we die!
 ~Pandu Gunawan, student democracy leader
TIMELINE
11 Mar 1966 General Suharto handed “emergency powers”after a
failed leftist coup leads to the killing of hundreds of
thousands of suspected Communists
27 Mar 1968 Suharto becomes president
1976 Indonesia invades East Timor
1997 Asian economic crisis
1998 Economic insecurity and political repression spur
massive pro-democracy demonstrations
12 May 1998 Six pro-democracy activists killed by Indonesian
security forces
18 May 1998 Students occupy Parliament building with no interven-
tion from armed forces
21 May 1998 President Suharto forced from office by massive,
nonviolent demonstrations; Vice President Babibie
sworn in as president
1999 Free elections: Wahid elected President
2000 President faces financial scandals
Jul 2001 Parliament dismissed Wahid. Vice President Megawati
Sukarnoputri sworn in as president
6
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As with nearly all of the “people power” revolutions captured
in this study, Indonesia’s was lead by its youth and students.
Suharto had seized power from an attempted communist coup,
and held Indonesia in his grip for over three decades. “Defam-
ing” the president was illegal, and those who did so were known
to disappear. Still, there were those Indonesians and Western
leaders who appreciated the stability Suharto had secured, as
well as a tangible reduction in poverty (which, however, did not
survive the East Asian crisis). They further appreciated the trade
route Indonesia provided and actually at one point referred to
Suharto as a “statesman.” (Barr Online).
Those acknowledgements aside, Suharto and his dictatorial
policies simply lost the consent of the governed. As with our other
case studies, this “people power” revolution was galvanized by a
brutal crackdown reminiscent of Tiananmen Square. The mili-
tary crackdown on protest riots left more than a thousand people
dead and “galvanized a nation” (Barr Online). With shouts of
“reformasi,” and even at one point burning Suharto in effigy, the
students filled the streets and as their demonstrations continued,
they were increasingly joined by faculty, parents, journalists,
nurses, and—crucially—the police. One jailed leading student
protester, Morsid Mudiantoro, even told of officers helping him
escape. “Everybody wanted to help,” he reported, indicating the
widespread sympathy with both pro-democratic and anti-
Suharto forces. This became clear to everyone when the number
of protestors at one demonstration reached nearly a million
people (Kristof Online).
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As ever, the role of the military was central; one analyst actu-
ally refers to their role as that of an “intermediary” (Nas). The
Indonesian military “avoided direct confrontation with pro-
democracy protestors and played a more behind-the-scenes role
in seeing to it that the anti-Suharto movement [did] not become a
full-scale toppling of the entire military and business elite”
(Sivaraman Online). The loss of the support of the military was
the nail in the regime’s coffin. There were even rumors that
“elements in the military [were] quietly backing the students”
(Kristof Online). Nas points to “the anti-communist attitude
gaining ground in the military,” which rendered them “highly
sympathetic” when the demonstrators, especially the Muslim
groups, called for a ban on the communist party. Regardless of
the extent to which this was true, “it was the military that al-
lowed the students to get on with their actions,” as they pursued
a policy mainly of noninvolvement, simply containing  the
demonstrations to campuses and Parliament (Nas Online).
Media technologies also aided the popular revolution. In our
other case studies, either some vestiges of a free press were in
place, such as in Georgia, or new communications technologies
enabled democrats to organize beyond the reach of the govern-
ment, as in the former Soviet Union or in China presently. As the
InterPress Service reported, “Indonesia’s turbulent events have
been blacked out by government-run news and media channels,”
yet “many Burmese have been able to follow the events closely
by listening to international radio broadcasts.” This of course has
been worrisome to the military junta in Burma, which fears that
8
Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy9
a successful democracy in its neighboring Indonesia will be
contagious.
Domestically, Suharto’s repression of the press was less effec-
tive due to the sheer mass of resistance against his regime. People
did not need to read about the protests—if they were not in one,
they still most likely witnessed them.
New technologies proved simply too difficult to regulate
sufficiently. For example, “One factor the government had not
counted on was that the protest actions taking place on a great
number of campuses all over Indonesia were coordinated by the
Internet.” Also, the actual occupation of the Parliament building
was “coordinated by the use of the Internet and mobile tele-
phones” (Nas).
Further broadening and strengthening this movement, the
students actively reached out to other like-minded groups, such
as women’s organizations and organized labor. A Muslim group
which apparently has 28 million members also endorsed the
demonstrations for democracy. The demonstrators were sup-
ported by other citizens, who supplied them with food and water
(Nas). This resulted in a critical mass that the government simply
could not deny, which became particularly critical when the
government lost the support of its armed forces.
Indonesia echoes another theme of our other case studies, as
well—the role of international context. For example, as Kristof
writes in the New York Times, an Indonesian professor explained
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that Suharto’s options were actually rather limited: “The Govern-
ment is cautious about taking action, because it would attract
international attention.” Ironically, perhaps its role as an impor-
tant trade route restricted Suharto’s options, just as it had once to
some extent protected him. So long as he provided stability, other
nations were not likely to intervene. No doubt aware of the power
of international support, some demonstrators—in a predomi-
nantly Muslim nation—paid tribute to the United States by
shouting “Long Live America” near the American Embassy (Nas
Online).
The use of symbolism to communicate and mobilize was a
part of this “people power” movement, as it was in Georgia and
Belgrade. Nas and Sluis explain that the use of architecture and
space was especially significant. They write, “The basic idea is
that the events during this ‘reformation’ were not randomly
dispersed throughout the capital. On the contrary, the sites of the
incidents had specific symbolic meanings chosen to convey the
intentions of the particular groups involved to a wider public,
even to the international forum covered by mass media” (Nas).
Specifically, they note, “the sites chosen or avoided for protests,
riots, and rituals throw light on the significance of these places in
Indonesian culture” (Nas). Merdeka Square was chosen because
it is “the center of a circle of monuments in Jakarta symbolizing
Indonesian nation building” that “constitute the symbolic heri-
tage of the Old Order vested under Sukarno.” Another example
of this is the choice of the demonstrating students to wear jackets
10
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sporting their University colors (remembering the animosity
between the university intellectuals and the Suharto regime).
Naturally, analysts and citizens watch and wonder if the
dramatic changes in Indonesia will be sustainable. The signs from
the most recent election are quite positive, so much so that the
Economist recently called Indonesia “a shining example” that
“deserves great praise for its speedy transition from autocracy,
through chaos, to democracy.” The elections were “free, fair,
peaceful, and above all, conducted in a spirit of moderation that
was remarkable in a country where democracy is only six years
old.” Exemplifying the crucial importance of strong leadership,
current president Megawati “urged everyone to accept the result,
whatever the result, even though she seems unlikely to remain in
office” (“Example” Online). This of course sets a significant
example and precedent for her opponents and future presidents
for peaceful, orderly transfers of power, and leadership that is
willing to concede defeat at the polls. Perhaps even more signifi-
cantly, Indonesian voters, having demanded democracy, seem
determined to protect and uphold it. Voters “by a large margin,
preferred a moderate military man to a nationalist throwback”
(“Example” Online). Significantly, none of the parties calling for
sharia (Islamic law) were able to garner much support. Having
seen some success in fighting extremism, corruption, and pov-
erty, and having just conducted an election which many pre-
dicted would be impossible for a predominantly Islamic country,
Indonesia offers ample reason to hope for the permanent success
of its peaceful, democratic revolution.
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Yugoslavia: 2000
If we have to defend our victory on the streets, we’ll
do that.
We’ve had enough!
~a Belgrade store clerk
TIMELINE
1991 The Soviet Union collapses, and Yugoslavia dissolves
into break-away provinces; majority of Serbs are
expelled from Croatia
Apr 1992 Slobodan Milosevic emerges as leader of the Serbia
and Montenegro Provinces after ethnic war erupts,
causing the death and displacement of millions
Nov 1995 Dayton Peace Accords signed
Mar 1998 Responding to unrest and attacks in Kosovo,
Milosevic sends in troops, and war reignites
Mar 1999 NATO launches air strikes against Serbian targets
24 Sep 2000 Vojislav Kostunica, the Opposition Leader, wins the
popular elections; Milosevic refuses to heed results.
Oct 2000 Massive demonstrations, totaling nearly a million
people, shut down Belgrade and beyond; Milosevic is
forced to step down.  Kostunica takes office
Apr 2001 Milosevic arrested for crimes against humanity
Jun 2001 Milosevic remanded to the International Criminal
Court at The Hague
12
Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy13
As in so many of these cases, it was a disputed election that
sparked the revolt. The Federal Elections Commission was at the
time controlled by Milosevic, and his regime refused to enact
most international free and fair election standards. The ballots
were counted behind closed doors, foreign reporters were ex-
pelled, and “independent poll monitors complained that the
elections were plagued from start to finish by wide-scale voting
irregularities, intimidation, and ballot stuffing designed to benefit
the regime.” Some state employees were told by their bosses “to
vote for Milosevic if they wanted to keep their jobs.” One report
even stated that Milosevic had ballots with his name checked off
preprinted! Significantly, Nikola Sainovic, former Milosevic
spokesman, even conceded privately that “the regime knew that
they lost on all levels” (Rozen Online). Yet publicly, the regime
declared victory. Further, “Milosevic and local SPS [Milosevic’s
Serbian Socialist Party] officials refused to hand over local power
and tried to give their arbitrary decision legality by forcing
election commissions and courts to annul the results on spurious
legal grounds” (Sekelj Online). Thus, it was hardly a surprise to
international observers or citizens of Serbia when, in September
of 2000, nearly half a million opposition members, students, and
demonstrators for democracy descended upon Belgrade demand-
ing that Milosevic honor the genuine results of the election,
concede, and hand over power.
Milosevic’s totalitarian tactics were in place throughout the
protests. For example, the streets were lined with armed police,
and plain clothes officers even infiltrated the marches. So dis-
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guised, they followed at least several dozen people to their homes
and then jailed them without access to lawyers or family. One
former parliamentarian suggested that the rise in police brutality
was a warning to voters that Milosevic would not tolerate another
scene such as in 1996, “when hundreds of thousands of people
were on the streets for months” (Todorovic). This was in stark
contrast to the techniques of the students, who organized a civil
disobedience group, “Otpor” (which means Resistance). Much
like other similar student groups (many of whom were actually
inspired by Otpor), Otpor was committed to non-violence. Fur-
ther, this commitment was explicit, thus perhaps lessening the
likelihood of demonstrators returning violence for violence. We
can see again the importance of the role of leadership in main-
taining a sustained, peaceful campaign for social change.
As in Georgia, the leaders of the movement publicly defined
themselves as nonviolent. Kostunica himself, who of course had
actually won the election, called for peace at the demonstrations:
“We must persist in a peaceful manner and respond to violence
with non-violence and to lies with truth” (“Yugoslavia Annuls”
Online).
Otpor and other resistance groups also used campaigns of civil
disobedience prior to the massive demonstrations. These actions
included strikes and using buses and even bulldozers to break
through police blockades (“Yugoslavia” Online). Other nonvio-
lent civil disobedience tactics included a staggering 20, 000
citizens coming to the rescue of coal mine strike organizers after
14
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Milosevic declared a crack-down on the strikers, arguing that
they threatened national electricity. Other strikers and activists
built barricades with dump trucks and dirt mounds, hoping to
bring the nation to a halt until Milosevic resigned (“Strikes,
Protests” Online).
As we have seen in nearly every other case study here, sym-
bolism has proven to be a powerful tool in the design of the
demonstrations. The symbolism used by the students in Belgrade
was particularly poignant. Their logo, a clenched fist, “has be-
come a popular symbol of putting national interests above oppo-
sition squabbles.” This was especially critical in the case of
Belgrade, as the opposition to Milosevic had previously been
bitterly divisive, fragmented, and, thus, ineffective (Todorovic).
As Balkans analyst Laslo Sekelj explained, “The opposition
entered the electoral campaign unprepared, divided by
internecine squabbles and without a convincing alternative
programme to the policy of SPS  and Milosevic” (Sekelj Online).
Once this fragmentation was overcome by the formation of
the Democratic Opposition, a coalition of various opposition
groups, Milosevic’s power waned significantly. Employing
another symbol, some students stacked bricks along the streets of
Belgrade, expressing their desire to rebuild and be peaceful and
constructive, rather than destructive. Even more startling, an-
other group left a loaf of bread on the steps of the government
building, a traditional Yugoslavian symbol of friendship (BBC
Online). This seems to suggest the students’ desire for a peaceful
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change of power, rather than a violent civil war. Doubtless, most
Serbians (and everyone else in the former Yugoslavia) had suf-
fered more than enough. Perhaps the students meant to suggest
to Milosevic that he would not be harmed; the goal was simply
recognition of the genuine election results.
The role of the media is always crucial, and Belgrade was no
exception. Otpor and other opposition groups were labeled
terrorists and even “satanized” by state media. Rumors of a new
“law on terrorism” swirled, which “would give the government
lavish legal power against its most dangerous political oppo-
nents” (Todorovic Online; Sekelj Online). Hence, the necessary
fear was created to solidify some sort of support for the Milosevic
regime.
One analyst detailed this state monopoly of the media: “Clear
and unequivocal abuse of state television, the basic source of
information, and the most influential daily news paper Politika,
as well as a series of other media, by the ruling party has existed
in all parliamentary and presidential elections…” For one ex-
ample, B2-92, an independent radio station, reported the dis-
missal of nearly 200 employees who were “fired for demanding a
change in editorial policy” (Radio Free Europe Online).
However, and this cannot be overemphasized, just as in Geor-
gia, the state monopoly of information “has never been total”
(Skeklj). This allowed some information to filter through to the
citizens of Serbia, strengthening the student, opposition, and pro-
democracy organizations, as well as the international community
16
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who enacted sanctions and political isolation against Milosevic.
(We should note that some argue this inadvertently played into
Milosevic’s hands as it aided him in demonizing the West, free
markets, and democracy. Milosevic was quoted as warning
voters, “With the money that they have received from abroad,
[the West] is buying, blackmailing and scaring citizens.” His
rhetoric implied that a vote for the opposition was a vote for
those who had caused the NATO bombing).
The international press was also able to bring news of the
staggering poverty and totalitarianism of Milosevic’s regime and,
perhaps most importantly, news of the massive, months-long
waves of protests that resulted from the fraudulent elections.
CNN and BBC, for example, were both able to report the con-
testing of Milosevic’s “victory,” as well as the eventual annul-
ment of the results. Besides encouraging the resistance
movement, heads of state and world leaders at the time, such as
Kofi Annan and Bill Clinton, clearly desired his removal from
power. The US-funded opposition movement and, of course,
international sanctions devastated an already war-ravaged
economy. Further weakening Milosevic internationally, Ger-
many, Britain, France, Italy, and the United Nations all declared
the victory of his opponent, Kostunica (Ahern Online).
Eventually, the regime could no longer deny reality and on
October 3, 2000, Slobodan Milosevic stepped down from power.
He was shortly thereafter arrested by the International Criminal
Court for crimes against humanity. All of the traditional signs of
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a successful civil revolution were present. We examined the role
of the media above; it is also notable that the armed forces and
police force played a significant role in Milosevic’s downfall as
well. The army’s conscripted soldiers had little cause for loyalty to
the regime, especially once the demonstrations proved unrelent-
ing and peaceable. Many of the officers and soldiers, scarcely
happier with Milosevic than the protesters, joined them.
As the above numbers suggest, a “critical mass of citizens
from the provinces” swarmed into the city in bus loads. This is a
familiar recipe for a powerful nonviolent revolution.
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Hong Kong: One State, Two Systems?2003
If Hong Kong does not become democratic,
there is no future for her!
~Jeff Chan, at a rally for democracy
TIMELINE
1997 Hong Kong gains independence from Britain: China
chooses Tung Chee-hwa as Chief Executive
1 Jul 2003 500,000 protest “anti-subversion” law
7 Jul 2003 Tung Chee-hwa withdraws “anti-subversion” bill
Jul 2003 Security Secretary Regina Ip, who was largely re-
sponsible for the “anti-subversion” bill, resigns
Apr 2004 China assumes veto-power over elections
1 Jul 2004 Hundreds of thousands protest for direct elections
500,000 people demonstrated in Hong Kong on July 1st, 2003.
Demonstrations continue, and appear to be slowly but surely
loosening the grip of China’s one-party rule, which insists that
Hong Kong is and should remain a part of China. The size and
tenacious persistence of these protests are remarkable, particu-
larly considering the personal risk undertaken by those involved.
In many of our case studies, a fraudulent election sparked the
movement for nonviolent, democratic change. In the case of
Hong Kong, the focal point of most of the recent demonstrations
has been a recent “anti-subversion” law that China attempted to
pass, which resulted in half a million citizens marching in protest,
as well as subsequent candlelight vigils, and other, smaller
marches.
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Mr. Tung Chee-hwa, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive, was
forced to rethink his previous support for the law, which had
presumably resulted from pressure by China. His change in
stance was due to a combination of the massive protests as well as
the resignation of a prominent cabinet member from the Liberal
Party, James Tien (“People Power” Online). One report called
this “an unprecedented political defeat” for Mr. Chee-hwa
(Beveridge Online).
The reviled law would have allowed police to search without a
warrant. It also would have given the government power to ban
certain types of assembly: namely groups already outlawed on
the mainland. The attempt to pass the anti-subversion law was
preceded by pronouncements on April 6, 2004, by China’s Na-
tional People’s Congress (NPC) that “made it clear… that any
move to introduce greater democracy in Hong Kong will need
prior clearance.” This was a reversal of prior Chinese policy.
Nearly ten years had passed since the Chinese government had
issued a proclamation on the “Basic Law,” which created the
“one state, two systems” model after Hong Kong gained its
independence from Britain in 1997. China currently claims no
possibility that it will recognize Hong Kong elections before 2008
(“One Country” Online).
In response, the Article 45 Concern Group, a group of constitu-
tional scholars from Hong Kong, has formed. They argue that
China’s refusal to allow elections and the provisions included in
20
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the “anti-subversion” law are “a naked use of power with no
legal basis” (Marquand Online).
The international and geopolitical context has left its mark on
the conflict. Various US leaders, including the US National
Security Advisor, Dr. Condolezza Rice, have made statements
supporting the right of the people of Hong Kong to seek political
reform. China’s party line has been to insist that Hong Kong
already enjoys “real and unprecedented democracy,” and that
any support of any kind from the US would be viewed as an
unwelcome intrusion into domestic affairs. A spokeswoman for
the Communist government, for example, said China was “reso-
lutely opposed to foreign interference.” (BreakingNews.com).
Still, China’s refusal to allow direct elections “brought the stron-
gest censure yet from the US and Britain” (Marquand Online).
As recently as July 2004, nearly half a million protestors rallied
once again in support of democratic reforms. The specific de-
mand of the most recent rally was for direct elections in 2007;
many marchers also called on Chehwa, appointed by China, to
step down. The make up of the demonstration was, appropri-
ately, democratic, including “grandmothers, young parents,
punk-rockers, and stockbrokers” and the size of the demonstra-
tion effectively killed any hope that China might have had that
the demand for greater freedoms would wane. One demonstrator
was quoted as insisting, “I know that’s what they say, no vote in
2007. But we are going to keep putting the pressure on. We will
take to the streets till we can vote” (Marquand Online). Appar-
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ently, the stunning turnout to the rally would have been even
greater had it not been for dangerously intense heat. Some
marchers held black balloons which were to represent the pres-
ence of family members who could not participate. The line of
protestors reportedly stretched for two miles.
The symbolism used in these protests was clearly designed to
communicate unity. Hundreds of thousands of participants wore
white, which is the color of mourning in China (Marquand
Online). This was reminiscent of last year’s protests aimed di-
rectly at the “anti-subversion law,” when the marches all wore
black. Even the brutal heat was used as an opportunity to chal-
lenge the oppression from the mainland, and to demonstrate a
forceful show of numbers: “Many sported umbrellas with the
word “suffrage,” and cooled themselves with fans that read
“power to the people” (Marquand). In an effort to communicate
to China that their desire is for democracy, not an expression of
protest against China, many demonstrators carried olive
branches (Pan Online). Even the date of the march was symbolic;
it was held on July 1st, the anniversary of Hong Kong’s handover
from Britain to China.
Needless to say, the Chinese media was nearly silent about the
demonstration, and the Hong Kong media seems to have been
largely cowed. For example, “a study released this week by the
Hong Kong Journalists Association looked at the city’s 14 leading
newspapers from Jan. 28 to March 8—a period corresponding
with a ‘patriotism debate’ introduced by Beijing.” The results
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were that “of all headlines during that period, 55 percent sup-
ported the patriot litmus test, while only 15 percent back the pro-
democracy positon.” Further, several radio hosts were forced to
leave their jobs after receiving threatening phone calls
(Marquand Online). In fact, some of the signs that demonstrators
carried paid tribute to them, bearing their pictures and reading,
“Please Come Back!”
Many have found China’s response to be particularly draco-
nian, especially considering that Hong Kong’s demand has been
for direct elections and reform, not independence. Martin Lee, a
well known activist for democracy, made this explicit: “We are
here today to fight for democracy… Not a single person here
wants independence” (Lyn). Many activists, and even those
suspected of considering voting for the Democratic Party, report
receiving violently threatening phone calls and having their jobs
threatened (Lyn). Further, those Beijing deemed “unpatriotic”
were automatically considered unfit for public office (Marquand).
The resolution of this conflict remains to be seen. Elections are
approaching in September, and one Hong Kong political analyst,
Christine Loh, predicted that “Beijing will try to win the hearts
and minds of Hong Kong people because of these elections”
(YahooNews Online). The effective display of “people power”
successfully halted the passage of widely detested legislation;
perhaps the recent demonstrations, which have been just as
massive and have received considerable international attention,
can win the vote!
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Georgia’s Rose Revolution
Kmara! (Enough!)
 ~Student Resistance Group Slogan
TIMELINE
2 Nov 2003 Parliamentary elections criticized as fraudulent.
Officials declare President Shevardnadze the winner
23 Nov 2003 Thousands demonstrate in support of opposition
candidate, Mikhail Saakashvili. Demonstrators take
over parliament building Shevardnadze resigns
4 Jan 2004 New elections held. Saakashvili wins
23 Jan 2004 Abashidze, Adjarian leader, declares state of emer-
gency in protest of Saakashvili victory; Demonstra-
tors demand Abashidze's resignation
Mar 2004 Abashidze resigns and leaves Georgia; Adjarian
Parliamentary elections held; Saakashvili’s party wins
majority.
  The Republic of Georgia’s recent peaceful ( if fragile) change
of power provides a near blueprint for future peaceful demonstra-
tions and non-violent transitions to democracy. Many of the
necessary conditions were in place: a leadership that explicitly
called for peaceful demonstrations, some sort of established
relationships with international NGOs, the beginnings of civil
society, and some outlets of a free press which were able to cover
both the demonstrations and the charges of government corrup-
tion. The opposition leader, now President Mikhail Saakashvili,
also employed a unique and powerfully symbolic strategy which
gained the allegiance of the government’s security forces. Some
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analysts also note that the US and Russian strategic interests in
the area compelled them to be involved in a peaceful resolution to
the dispute. For example, Russian foreign minister, Igor Ivanov
personally helped negotiate Shevardnadze’s resignation from
office, and US envoy James Baker was sent to assist the forma-
tion of the Central Election Commission.
Non-violent popular demonstrations tend to be sparked, after
dissatisfaction has been steadily growing, by a specific event that
symbolizes all of the other dissatisfactions. As was the case in
Georgia, an election perceived to be fraudulent caused resistance
to mobilize. Directly contradicting all exit polls, the government’s
election commission declared Shevardnadze the victor. As Civil
Disobedience Commission (CDC) member Irakli Kakabadze
wrote in his first-hand account, “This was the final blow to the
disenfranchised citizenry of Georgia and they decided that
dramatic civil disobedience was necessary” (Kakabadzi 3).
Kakabadze and other activists and civil leaders met to plan their
course of action, guided, as he notes, by such thinkers as Martin
Luther King, Jr., Johann Galtung, and Gandhi. A student resis-
tance group called Kmara (“enough”) formed, modeled on and
mentioned by the Belgrade student group, Otpor.  This partner-
ship explicitly suggests the transnational nature of this movement
for democracy.  Kmara staged demonstrations and rallies de-
manding Shevardnadze’s resignation, and are said to be respon-
sible for the word “Kmara!” being spraypainted on buildings in
Tbilisi as resistance mobilized (Miller).
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One essential element of this revolution’s success was the
strategy the CDC used to win the cooperation of the armed
forces, which did not fire a single shot at any of the protestors,
despite earlier statements by Shevardnadze that he would be
willing to use force to stop protests if that proved necessary.
Demonstrators announced their clear intent to protest peacefully
and,  by handing out roses, feeding, and even embracing the
soldiers, communicated that they did not wish to fight with the
armed forces. Conflict theory sheds light on this process: violent
conflicts will usually escalate only if one of the parties perceives a
clear threat to identity or survival. Further, the loss of the support
of the military seemed to underscore the unpopularity of
Shevardnadze’s regime.
It remains very much to be seen whether the lack of violence
can be sustained. Shortly after the election in which President
Saakashvili, who led the peaceful protests against the fraudulent
elections of Shevardnadze, was chosen, a bomb was exploded
near the headquarters of the Labor Party. No one was hurt,
which is perhaps a major reason why it has not thus far incited
retaliation. Still, the new government has Herculean challenges
ahead if they are to fulfill the promise of their revolution and
establish the infrastructure of civil society and democracy, as
virtually every analyst points out. Saakashvili, described as a
“relative political novice with a fiery temperament,” has inherited
a bankrupt government, soaring unemployment, gross corrup-
tion, poverty (over half the population), and at least two prov-
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inces, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, that are headed by separat-
ists (“Georgia Votes”, EIW Online).
As in each of these cases, today’s reformer could be
tomorrow’s strongman, which is the reason so many experts
watch for institutions and infrastructure to judge a new
democracy’s progress rather than official statements. It is still
quite early to judge this in Saakashvili’s case, but there seems to
be reason for at least some measure of concern. The new constitu-
tion “allows the president to dissolve parliament and consider-
ably weakens the legislature.” Further, Saakashvili “has publicly
stated that he does not see the need for a parliamentary opposi-
tion” (Hays Online). Still, the Rose Revolution seems to demon-
strate that Georgia has a strong and growing civil society that is
prepared to peacefully protect its new freedoms.
In fact, Kmara’s example has proven contagious already!
Consider, for example, the current events unfolding in Adjaria.
Nearly concurrent with Georgia’s Rose Revolution, the citizens of
this autonomous region of the former Soviet Union began agitat-
ing for democracy. Used to power and semi-feudal methods of
governance, Adjarian ruler Mr. Abashidze threatened his people
with violence. When this did not deter their activism, he brought
in Russian military instructors to train his police. This was like-
wise ineffective. Finally, in May 2004, he had bridges blown up
in his own territory! At this, the majority of the population dem-
onstrated in the streets, demanding Abashidze’s resignation.
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Saakashvili began negotiations, offering Abashidze assurances
of safety if he resigned. Meanwhile, the government of Georgia
estimated that Abashidze had pilfered roughly 1.5 billion (in US
dollars) from his public budget. According to reports, he flew to
Moscow and has not been seen in Adjaria since (“Abashidze”
Online).
Abashidze officially resigned on May 6, 2004, and a tempo-
rary administration took power. In the new elections, which were
held on June 21, 2004, the National Movement and Republican
parties of Georgia won the supreme council seats of Adjaria.
There was celebrating in the streets at Abashidze’s resignation,
and many now refer to this as the “Rose Revolution N2.” The
Rose Revolution itself was unprecedented in the Caucuses, and
for it to have been essentially repeated elsewhere, albeit on a
smaller scale, hopefully suggests the sustainability of these peace-
ful changes of power and of the beginnings of true democracy in
the former Soviet Union.
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Conclusions
As is evident from the above cases, peaceful popular revolu-
tions share a number of causes and characteristics in common.
One related phenomena we have noticed is that, in every single
case study, the ruling elite had lost the support of the military—
often, of course, the only means by which the regime was able to
keep power. In some cases, the soldiers allowed the demonstra-
tors to proceed unharmed, as the protest was peaceful. Often, the
organizers of the resistance explicitly reached out to the military,
as was most clearly seen in Georgia. At times, as in Belgrade, the
security forces even joined the demonstrators.
A second common characteristic is the skillful and poignant
use of symbolism to galvanize civil society, specifically to rally
the people around a message that was revolutionary and populist
as well as peaceful. Georgia’s Rose Revolution, of course, is a
powerful example—the students and other protesters not only
offered the soldiers guarding the presidential and parliament
buildings roses, eyewitnesses and participants report that many
of the demonstrators actually hugged them as well!
Belgrade has a similar tale to tell. As Slobodan Milosevic’s
“victory” in the 2000 elections was being celebrated by his sup-
porters, nearly half a million protesters demanded that he con-
cede the election and admit to the fraud he had perpetrated.
Expressive of their desire that the protest be peaceful and con-
structive, rather than violent, many protesters stacked bricks on
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the streets as a symbol of rebuilding. Others brought bread to the
government building where Milosevic and the remains of his
government were still installed—in Serbian tradition, this bread
was a symbol of friendship (“Milosevic” BBC Online). The most
recent protest in Hong Kong against the central government in
Beijing’s refusal to allow a vote featured its almost half a million
participants all wearing white t-shirts in a display of visual unity
(Bradsher Online).
The media, including new communications technologies such
as cell phones and faxes, have also played central roles in these
peaceful revolutions; they provided a means of political organiz-
ing and communicating which the government was unable to
regulate. One former Russian official even noted that the Soviet
Union was brought down, in his view, by the fax machine. As
Reader’s Digest once reported, “Workers of the World, Fax!” was
the headline of a Washington Post article in late 1990 during the
waning days of the Cold War. Michael Dobbs reported that
correspondents in the Soviet Union had gone from having too
little information to too much. It was a “revolution by fax”, he
wrote, which “has made a mockery of attempts by Communist
Party bureaucrats to control the flow of news” (Reader’s Digest
Online). Similarly, the student democracy demonstrations in
Tiananmen Square are often referred to as a “revolution by fax.”
The press in many of these cases also played a central role, pro-
viding a means of disseminating information about fraudulent
elections, protests against the government and the like. This
coverage also helped attract and enable the support of the inter-
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national community, another common factor in the success of
these historic popular revolutions. As Dr. Kurt Mills wrote, “Gil
Scott-Heron says that ‘The revolution will not be televised.’ The
global reach of CNN makes that claim doubtful. Regardless,
however, the revolution will be digitized, faxed, e-mailed, up-
loaded, and generally be available electronically to a large por-
tion of humanity” (“Cybernations” Online).  Despite the
opportunities that this presents, these new technologies are not
available to two-thirds of the world.  Access to electricity and
even literacy, in an ever more printed world, is a must if the
poorest of the poor are to close this digital divide, and thus have
some hope of bettering their situations.
International context and the connections between domestic
resistance groups, such as Otpor in Belgrade or Kmara in Geor-
gia, was also influential. The concerns of various neighboring
nations, as well as the involvement of powers such as the US, the
EU, the UN and Russia, in some cases provided pressure on the
sitting government to concede falsified elections, or enact certain
democratic reforms. Without disregarding the number of valid
concerns many have expressed about globalization, this process
as represented by new technologies and international forums of
governance can offer crucial advantages to voices who otherwise
would struggle to be heard.
Nepal, Indonesia, Belgrade, Hong Kong and Georgia all offer
hope that peaceful social change is possible.  Some of the resistant
groups, most notably Otpor and Kmara, were explicitly linked,
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with Otpor mentoring Kmara during its Rose Revolution.  Yet all
of these movements are connected by a common zeitgeist—a
passionate belief that peaceful change is possible and a growing
conviction across the globe that fundamental human and civil
rights are not negotiable; hence the contagious nature of these
movements. They also, however, represent a new and growing
trend across the globe of civil political expression, possibly the
nascent beginnings of a global civil society.  This is perhaps most
evident in the protests against globalization as we know it.  Citi-
zens are demonstrating for change because they know the
North/South gap, the gap between the wealthy minority and the
poor masses, is growing larger, not smaller.  They are demanding
that their needs be a priority.
If this new phenomenon of peaceful revolutions is to be dealt
with effectively, in a manner that protects civil freedoms and
human rights regardless of in what nation one was born, govern-
ments will soon find it necessary to begin creating policies and
institutional mechanisms to respond to these demonstrations of
people power.  Most importantly, governments must learn how
to listen to their people to determine what their needs are before
violence occurs; once a conflict beings to escalate to violence, it
becomes astronomically more difficult to resolve peacefully.
Presently, governments are not changing with this new reality,
and their people are leaving them behind.
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